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Introduction
Controversy has surrounded accounting disclosure of derivative instruments for some time. Logan, Chairman of TMA, noted three major objections to more disclosure of derivatives including the following assessment of the effect on competition:
"Half of the respondents to the TMA survey stated that at least some of the disclosures required by the proposed FASB and SEC requirements would be proprietary information that could provide competitors with an unfair business advantage."
The purpose of this paper is to assess the merit of these concerns and consider the larger issue of non-hedging incentives for firms to engage in forward contracts on future production. In the absence of an information asymmetry, Allaz (1992) identifies one such motive, i.e., a firstmover advantage. The basic idea is that forward contracts commit the contracting firm to more aggressive output decisions, which constructively preempt a portion of demand. Rival noncontracting firms react rationally to curtail their production, thereby conceding market share.
Drawing on the insight of Bagwell (1995) , 1 Hughes and Kao (1997) show that contract disclosure is crucial to achieving this advantage. When forward contracts are not disclosed, the contracting firm cannot influence rivals' beliefs and hence loses its first-mover advantage.
Introducing private information on the part of the contracting firm sets up a tension, not considered by Hughes and Kao (1997) , between the disclosure of forward contracts as a device to implement a first-mover advantage and as a means for rivals to learn the contracting firm's information, thereby eliminating an information advantage in subsequent production decisions.
Not only would the contracting firm lose its information advantage, but, similar to Gal-Or's (1987) results in her extension of the classic Stackelberg game to incorporate private information by the Stackelberg leader, 2 the prospect of influencing rival beliefs through disclosure of its forward position could cause the contracting firm to distort that position in a manner that undermines the first-mover advantage.
A further motive for a firm with private information to enter the forward market is to exploit an information advantage over other forward market participants obliged to trade for noninformational reasons. The contracting firm taking a position in the forward market is similar to that of an insider trading in the stock market. The setting here, however, is somewhat more complicated than in say Kyle's (1985) model due to the presence of a production continuationgame between the contracting firm and its rivals. While (ex post) disclosure of forward contracts would have no direct effect on expected gains to private information in the forward market, there could be indirect effects owing to the role of such disclosure with respect to the first-mover advantage and attempts to influence rival firm beliefs.
2 Gal-Or (1987) shows that the only stable equilibrium in this context is one in which the contracting firm's private information is revealed in any event. However, the incentive to influence the follower's beliefs induces the leader to distort production from the level that would be optimal in the absence of this incentive. A similar effect occurs in our model, thereby diminishing the first-mover advantage that accompanies disclosure.
In this study, we characterize the consequences of disclosure by simultaneously taking into account the effects of information asymmetries in both forward markets and product markets. Specifically, we model a setting in which one of two, otherwise identical, producers of a homogeneous good receives private demand information and engages in forward contracting.
Trades of other forward market participants are generated exogenously. Similar to the technique employed by Kyle (1985) , a competitive broker sets forward prices to break even. 3 The principal forces facing the contracting firm are the desire to exploit its private information advantage over both the rival producer and uninformed forward market participants, and to implement a firstmover advantage over the rival producer. We consider two disclosure regimes: the contracting firm discloses or does not disclose its forward position prior to production. 4 Although risk aversion may also play a role in forward contracting decisions, we choose to abstract away from this aspect by assuming firms to be risk neutral. Incorporating a motive to hedge risks would complicate the analysis without altering our results on preferences towards disclosure in a qualitative sense.
The results of our analysis indicate that a privately informed firm engaged in forward contracting would prefer not to disclose its forward position to preserve an information advantage over rival firms in the production decisions that follow, and to better exploit its information advantage over other traders in the forward markets. While, on average, the firm gains a first-mover advantage at production stage of the game through disclosure of forward contracts, it is achieved at the cost of losing an information advantage to the rival producer.
Moreover, the presence of a first-mover advantage provides the contracting firm with an incentive to distort its forward position away from the position that would be optimal if the sole purpose was to exploit its information advantage in the forward market. 5 On balance, the gains from retaining an information advantage at the production stage and eliminating a dysfunctional incentive to distort one's forward position in extracting gains from private information in the forward market outweigh the loss of a diminished first-mover advantage.
Further results indicate that, depending on the level of noise trading by other participants in the forward market, the rival firm may be better off with or without disclosure by the contracting firm. There are two opposing effects of disclosure on the rival to consider, one beneficial and the other detrimental. The former is made possible because disclosure informs the rival of the otherwise unknown level of demand, and allows it to adjust production to a more efficient level in situations where actual demand differs from the expected one. The latter occurs because, on average, the contracting firm gains a first-mover advantage with disclosure. Ex post, for demand realizations near the mean, the net effect of disclosure makes the rival worse off; whereas for demand realizations far from the mean, it makes the rival better off. Ex ante, the net effect of disclosure depends on how much the rival gains as demand varies from its mean.
Substantial noise in the forward market induces the contracting firm to respond in a more contrarian way to demand in choosing its production that, in turn, enables the rival to capture the greater production efficiency benefits when extreme demand realizations are observed. With sufficient noise, the rival benefits ex ante from disclosure. Otherwise, disclosure harms the rival.
Uninformed forward market participants are always better off when the contracting firm discloses forward contracts. This is because the incentive to achieve a first-mover advantage and the incentive to influence a rival's beliefs through the position taken in the forward market under disclosure alter the incentives of the privately informed contracting firm in the forward market, thereby lowering the expected losses of the uninformed market participants.
To appreciate the role of an information asymmetry in the forward market, we also consider a setting in which other forward market participants are informed. Although the contracting firm's information advantage in the forward market would be severely diminished by competition even if only a small number of other forward market participants were informed, we assume as a modeling convenience the limiting case where that advantage is completely dissipated. In this case, the only trade-off facing the contracting firm is between surrendering an information advantage over its rival producer through disclosure of its forward position and forgoing a first-mover advantage when that position is not disclosed. Not surprisingly, the contracting firm's disclosure decision depends crucially on the value of its private information as measured by the variance of demand. When that value is low, the contracting firm prefers a policy of disclosing forward contracts because in this case information advantage is too small to justify giving up a first-mover advantage.
To summarize, within the context of our model, the gain to the contracting firm from retaining both its information advantage over rival producers and its ability to more fully exploit the uninformed forward market participants when forward contracts are not disclosed outweighs the loss of a first-mover advantage in production decisions when those contracts are disclosed.
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5 Of course, it is also true that the presence of an information advantage in the forward market motivates the contracting firm to distort its forward position away from the optimal level obtained when exploiting a first-mover advantage were the only concern. 6 Concavities in profit functions due to progressive taxes, agency conflicts, or risk aversion per se would further enhance the prospects of entering the forward market under disclosure; e.g., Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) .
Only in the less plausible case where the information asymmetry does not extend to the forward market do we find conditions under which the contracting firm would prefer no disclosure.
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A number of studies in the accounting literature have considered the economic consequences of alternative methods of accounting for derivatives and positions hedged by these instruments. For example, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) show that disclosure of hedge positions can affect hedge decisions in an adverse selection setting. Jorgensen (1997) models how the accounting treatment for hedges can impact on a moral hazard problem. Fischer (1999) provides conditions under which a firm can assist its employees in managing their exposure to risk through compensation when they are otherwise unable to do so due to moral hazard. Melumad, Weyns, and Ziv (1999) depict ways in which a particular accounting method employed by the firm may influence hedge positions taken by its managers. As a final example, Kanodia, Mukherji, Sapra, Venugopalan (2000) characterize the properties of futures prices as aggregators of private information in contexts where coincidental firm disclosures may also play a role.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the concern expressed by managers in practice that disclosure of derivatives might disadvantageously reveal proprietary information to rival firms has not been addressed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our analysis;
Section 3 considers the setting wherein the only information asymmetry pertains to rival firms;
and Section 4 concludes the paper. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show quantity commitments and Bertrand price competition replicate Cournot competition.
Analysis

Basic Model
We assume that the industry consists of two expected profit-maximizing firms, denoted Firm 1 and Firm 2. At time 0, one of the firms, Firm 1, privately observes a demand parameter, a , and chooses a forward quantity, 1 f Q . 8 Firm 2 does not observe a , nor does it trade in the forward market. Although our analysis only considers the asymmetric case where just one firm is uninformed and participates the forward market, similar incentives would also be present in the symmetric case where both firms are privately informed and participate in the forward market.
More is said about alternative assumptions in our conclusion.
For modeling purposes, we further assume that a competitive broker receives an order for 
where α and β are endogenously determined parameters. At this stage, linearity in the pricing rule is merely conjectured, as in Kyle (1985) . We will subsequently validate this conjecture by demonstrating that, in equilibrium, the market maker's posterior expectation of the future spot price is linear in the total order flow.
At time 1, Firms 1 and 2 choose their outputs from production, 1 Q and 2 Q , respectively.
Without loss of generality, marginal cost for both firms is assumed to be a constant , 0 cac >> .
In the non-disclosure regime, Firm 2 makes its production choice without At time 2, the demand parameter, a , is realized and the spot price, , P is determined by the following linear inverse demand function:
Note that Firm 1 can perfectly anticipate the spot price, , P at the time of forward market participation. This is an unnecessarily strong assumption made solely for mathematical tractability. If, instead, Firm 1 were to receive a noisy signal for a , this would merely lead to variance in , P that would increase the variance in profits, but due to symmetry, would have no effect on expected profits and thus have no effect on behavior.
Finally, at time 3, Firm 1 covers its forward position, both firms sell their production, and firm profits are realized. Figure 1 provides a time line of these events.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Profit functions of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are
respectively. The first term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of (3) Substituting (7) and (6) This concludes the discussion of the production sub-game. We next characterize the forward-contracting sub-game for each of the disclosure regimes.
No Disclosure Regime
If Firm 1 does not disclose its forward position, Firm 2 learns nothing about either the forward market or the spot market demand parameter, . a 9 In this case, Firm 2's conjecture about a is given by the mean of the distribution, and its conjecture about 1 f Q is given by an endogenously determined constant γ , i.e., * aa = and
We assume in this section that Firm 2 observes neither the forward quantity nor forward price at which Firm 1 traded. It might be reasonable to expect that if the forward market is public, then the forward price would be observable, and Firm 2 could use this information to infer a noisy estimate of Firm 1's forward quantity. 10 That case (with price but not quantity observed) is significantly more complex mathematically and might be intractable. Moreover, explicit derivation of that case is unlikely to provide new insight. In effect, this case is equivalent to noisy disclosure of forward quantity and, therefore, is basically a convex combination of the two extreme cases of no disclosure and full disclosure analyzed in the paper.
With these conjectures, the production stage equilibrium, (6)- (8) 
The forward quantity, 1 f Q , is decreasing in unexpected demand, ) ( a a − , since it is better to enter a forward contract to buy (go long) rather than to sell (go short) when demand is strong.
We further note that the absolute forward quantity is decreasing (increasing) in the slope of the forward price function (demand curve).
Since γ is the average choice of 1 , f Qit is straightforward to see that, after taking expectation of (13), the only γ that satisfies the resulting expression is zero. In other words, we obtain the following solution:
Note that β could also be derived as a linear regression slope coefficient, which equals the negative of the ratio of the covariance of the spot price and total order flow to the variance of the total order flow as in Kyle (1985) , yielding the same result.
Substituting for α and β from (14) and (16), respectively, in (15) and (1) 
The firm goes long in the forward market (commits to buy) when demand exceeds expectations and the spot price will therefore exceed expectations. Similarly, the firm goes short (commits to sell) if demand is unexpectedly low. Trading intensity increases in the ratio of noise to signal variance, as that ratio determines how much disguise is provided by the presence of uninformed traders. Given the firm's trade, it expects a higher forward price when demand is stronger, due to the market maker inferring part of the firm's information from the order flow.
Having arrived at 1 , f Q the equilibrium outputs and equilibrium spot price for the production stage, (10) and (11), become: Firm 1's uncommitted output increases in demand, as would be the case absent forward contracting. The use of forward contracts increases this effect, since the forward position is negatively related to demand (to maximize forward market trading profits), and uncommitted output shifts in the opposite direction to partially offset the effect on total demand. Overall, forward trading leads to the spot price being more sensitive to demand than in the absence of forward markets. This sensitivity is to Firm 1's advantage in trying to maximize forward market trading profits, but reduces Firm 1's production profits.
Ex ante, the expected profits of Firm 1 and Firm 2 can be determined by first replacing 1 ,
Q and P in (3) and (4) with (17)- (20) 
Constructively, more noise in the forward market provides Firm 1 with greater disguise such that it can extract higher expected gains. These gains are partially dissipated by distortions in production. Given high (low) demand, Firm 1 has an incentive to under-or over-produce relative to the case with no forward market information asymmetry in order to manipulate the spot price.
For example, by over-producing when demand is low, Firm 1 seeks to reduce the spot price at which it will cover its forward position to sell at the pre-set forward price. 
Disclosure Regime
In contrast to the no disclosure regime, when Firm 1 publicly discloses its forward position, Firm 2's conjectures about the unknown spot market demand parameter will reflect that position, i.e., 
where γ and λ are both to be determined endogenously later. As before, linearity is merely conjectured, and we will subsequently validate it.
Given (24), the production stage equilibrium, (6)-(8), can be characterized as follows: . 13 On the other hand, γ can be solved for from the expectation of (28), after some simplification. 14 Both β and γ are functions of : λ ( ) ( )
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The SOC requires that 0 < λ < 2, so β is positive. Clearly, γ is positive as well. Thus, on average, Firm 1 takes a positive (short) forward position, committing to production and thereby gaining a first mover advantage, compelling Firm 2 to reduce production on average.
Given (30), we can restate the equilibrium production quantities and spot price, (25)- (26) 
13 It is easy to see that Q is less than 1, implying that Firm 2's production is less than it would be in standard Cournot competition with no information asymmetry. However, concomitant with incurring this second-mover penalty, Firm 2 benefits from learning a and being able to use this knowledge to adjust production to better match demand.
Using (30) in (27), α can also be expressed as a function of : λ
Substituting for the just derived ,, βγ and α in (1) and (28), we obtain the following expected forward price conditional on a and Firm 1's forward position (see the appendix for derivation of (35)): Equating the RHSs of (29) and (36) and rearranging terms result in a cubic function in λ :
A solution to (37) exists provided that there is sufficient noise relative to the information asymmetry in the forward market, i.e., 
The first result indicates that a low value of λ is consistent with on average less commitment by Firm 1 to over produce in its attempt to influence Firm 2's beliefs through the disclosed position in the forward market. This implies that Firm 2 is better off than in the case when λ is small since less over production by Firm 1 translates into higher spot prices and greater market share for Firm 2. The third result, that a low λ creates greater sensitivity of spot price to demand, implies that low λ magnifies the value of Firm 1's private information in the forward market and increases its forward trading profits. This provides a rationale for the Pareto dominance of the lower value of λ mentioned above.
The second result in (38) that, at the margin, higher demand induces Firm 1 to lower its production is surprising. With disclosure, Firm 2 learns a from Firm 1's disclosed forward position. As demand increases, Firm 2 increases its output. Firm 1 reacts to Firm 2's increased output by reducing its own output. At the same time, Firm 1 has an incentive to enhance its expected profits in the forward market by manipulating the spot price, which again leads to lower production by Firm 1, in response to strong demand. The last result in (38) implies that the presence of the forward market increases the sensitivity of the spot price to demand and is a consequence of Firm 1's manipulation of the spot price through subsequent production. Since λ is increasing in 
respectively. The first (second) term after the first equality sign of (39) is Firm 1's expected profits from the forward market (production). Again, both firms' expected profits depend on λ , or equivalently, on the variance of both noise trades and the demand parameter in the spot market (i.e., 
Comparison of Disclosure Regimes
Having characterized the expected profits for Firm 1 and Firm 2 under no disclosure and disclosure regimes, we are now in a position to examine the effect of disclosure on both firms and other uninformed forward market participants.
First consider Firm 1. The difference in expected profits across disclosure regimes is as follows:
11 DisclosureNoDisclosure EE Π−Π  (21) under no disclosure.
Since the difference is negative given Firm 1's limiting expected profit function under disclosure, it must continue to hold with any finite level of noise trading. Thus, we have our first proposition:
Proposition 1 Firm 1 strictly prefers no disclosure of forward contracts to disclosure of such contracts.
Proposition 1 provides a rationale for the claim made by producers that they would suffer competitive injury due to the revelation of proprietary information to rival firms if the FASB's proposed forward contract disclosure requirement were to become law. These claims are subtle in that a privately informed firm not only prefers to deny rival firms' access to its private information, but also desires to avoid incentives that could undermine its ability to extract gains from such information in the forward market.
Turning next to Firm 2, the difference in expected profits is as follows: 
where the expected profits in the two regimes are given by the RHS of (40) and (22), and (37) This proposition offers a plausible explanation for why the industry as a whole opposes to disclosure even though, ceteris paribus, firms that do not enter the forward market would benefit from having access to the private information of contracting firms.
Finally, the breakeven condition of the broker implies a zero-sum game. Since Firm 1 strictly prefers not to disclosure its forward position to better exploit the uninformed forward market participants, the interest of these participants is clearly opposite to that of the privately informed contracting firm. This is summarized below:
Proposition 3 Uninformed forward market participants strictly prefer disclosure of forward contracts to no disclosure of such contracts.
Informed Forward Market Participants
17 Recall that SOC requires 02. λ << Furthermore, only the lower root would ever be chosen, so in fact, λ will always be less than 1.2749. At λ = 0, the λ ratio in (42) is 2/3; at λ = 1.2749, the ratio is 1/3.
It is well known that in the Kyle-type (1985) settings, the expected gains to private information quickly dissipate as the number of informed traders increases. An interesting question to consider is whether circumstances exist under which Firm 1 would be better off with disclosure when we assume that other market participants are informed. In this case, forward price is based on the private information shared with these traders and their rational expectations regarding future production. To ease the analysis, we consider the extreme and, admittedly, implausible case where all forward market participants are informed and where disclosure includes the forward price as well as the forward quantity pertaining to the contracting firm.
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In the present setting, disclosure by Firm 1 eliminates the information asymmetry with Firm 2. Expected profits are therefore the same as that of the leader's in the Stackelberg game without information asymmetries:
In the absence of disclosure, Firm 1's expected profits given no information asymmetry in the forward market are similar to (21), except that the variance of the noise trading 2 n σ is now zero:
Comparing (43) with (44) results in the following difference:
18 By comparison, in the setting analyzed in the preceding section, the forward price had no incremental information beyond that contained in the disclosed forward position. 19 Given symmetric information at the production stage, Allaz (1992) has shown that in equilibrium An implication from Proposition 5 is that, for firms operating in a regime that requires disclosure, an information advantage over uninformed trades in the forward market could prove to be a curse, rather than a blessing. This is because the incentive to exploit such an advantage could induce the privately informed firm to over-commit to future production in order to influence its rival's beliefs, so much so that the resulting losses in profits from production per se overwhelm the gains in the forward market.
Conclusion
In this study, we considered the implications of mandating disclosure of forward contracts by privately informed contracting firms engaged in product market competition. Our results provide support for the opposition of financial executives toward mandating disclosure of forward contracts. In particular, these results suggest that the incentives to preserve an information advantage over rivals in production decisions and to maximize expected gains from trading on private information in the forward market outweigh the first-mover advantage achieved from revealing commitments to sell in advance of production. As a consequence, privately informed contracting firms would prefer a policy of no disclosure. Only in the less likely case where these firms do not enjoy information advantage over other forward market participants, we were able to identify conditions under which they are better off with mandated disclosure than without.
We also provide conditions under which non-privately informed rivals would likewise prefer non-disclosure.
An especially interesting insight on the consequences of having a production stage follow trading in the forward market with asymmetric information is that a privately informed contracting firm has an incentive to distort production so as to manipulate the future spot price after forward contracts are in place. This occurs because of its desire to extract further gains from forward contracts at the expense of uninformed participants in the forward market. Disclosure of forward contracts re-enforces this incentive to distort. Under this regime, rival producers increase their production upon observing higher demand realizations. Accordingly, the best response by the contracting firm in this case is to curtail its own production.
It is natural to ask how our results might be affected if we assumed that both firms had private information and traded in the forward market. First, we note that symmetry in these respects would not eliminate the incentives of firms to exploit uninformed traders in the forward market and to influence the behavior of their rival in choosing their outputs. As well, we surmise that since jointly aggressive production in seeking a first-mover advantage is mutually dysfunctional (analogous to a "prisoner's dilemma"), preferences for non-disclosure would be strengthened rather than diminished.
Another possibility is that both firms engage in forward contracting, but only one firm has private information. Given no disclosure, there is no change in our results because the only incentive for the non-privately informed firm to engage in forward contracting is to achieve a FIGURE 1 TIME LINE 
